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NEW TENDENCIES IN STATE POLICY TOWARD THE RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
IN EUROPEAN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 
by Dr. Inqo Roer 
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From 1970-79 he served as a secretary in 
the staff of the Christian Peace Confer-
ence in Prague. He has travelled widely 
in Eastern Europe. He now serves a parish 
in Frankfurt. 
V. Kuroyedov: "We take religious forces into account." 
There are observable signs in most socialist countries1 that a new 
relationship is being attempted between the state and religious 
denominations. Instead of mutual negativism common efforts in certain 
areas are developing. Ideological disputes seem to diminish in the face 
of practical cooperation, particularly in the areas of peace and the 
humanization of society. Socialist states no longer proceed on the 
assumption that religion will die out in the foreseeable future. They no 
longer view religious authorities across the board as reactionary. They 
expressly accord a certain legitimacy to religious activity; cooperation 
of religious groups in certain social tasks is being expected and they 
are therefore inclined to grant them a larger sphere of influence than 
before. Conversely, today the churches do not assume that socialist 
governments will break down in the near future. 
On the occasion of the first full session of the Ecumenical Council 
of Churches in 1948 in Amsterdam, John Foster Dulles had declared the 
socialist state to be a false deity "which has usurped for itself the 
throne of a spiritual absolute power and which robs the individual soul 
of every free, moral, cultural, and intellectual self determination." 
This is the way in which the Czech theologian Joseph L. Hromadka had 
summarized Western criticism at that time in his own speech at 
Amsterdam. The churches are frequently prepared to admit today, that in 
1Editor' s remark: Roer uses the term "socialist countries" in relation 
to the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. It would appear 
that many of his remarks are inapplicable at the very least to Albania 
and Yugoslavia. 
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regard to social questions, things were not always done and supported by 
the churches, which might have been necessary and economically feasible. 
The Czech theologian Jozef Smolik formulates it this way: "Churches no 
longer wish to overlook the area of jurisdiction and the offE!r of grace 
and promise, which the socialist state represents." 
Christians and churches in the socialist countries are prepared to 
take a realistic attitude toward the post-Constanti~ian age, which has 
already begun for them. They are beginning to recognize that the state 
in which they live is a government viewing itself as completely secular. 
This state has its foundation, according to its own self:--definition, in 
the will of the working class and in the recognition and acceptance of 
historical legality and necessity. This state rejects the idea of an 
origin in God and also rejects the idea of subordinating itself to God's 
mission. 
On one hand, the radical way in which Marxism embraces atheism 
makes the existence of churches in socialist cour.tries anything but 
easy. On the other hand, atheism is a clear position, which allows the 
churches on their part to formulate their mission as clearly as the 
state does and to separate it from the ideology of the Communist Party. 
From the beginning there was a tension between the ideological claim, 
according to which atheism is a fundamental part of Marxism (and not 
solely historically, as Hromadka asserted) and the recognition of the 
legal existence of religious denominations, which are sometimes 
partially funded by the atheistic state (as, for example, in the Soviet 
Union) . These problems between the state and religious denominations 
have been aired politically in recent years, specifically, in conver-
sations and negotiations with one another. Signs of this development may 
have been observed in all the socialist countries. Some socialist states 
reacted to the placement of new missiles in ce:ntral Europe with 
restrictive measures against religious groups. The condition for the new 
relationship between the state and religious coz:.gregations are so 
different in each country anyway that this process must be examined 
separately for each one. 
USSR 
Under Krushchev there was a new wave of open persecution of 
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believers. Undue bureaucratic influence and muzzling, as well as the 
meddling of the state in purely religious matters, were effectuated 
partially by means of new rules, partially simply by dint of oral 
commands, against which no protest was possible. Then in March 1980 the 
chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs in the Council of 
ministers of the USSR {referred to simply as "Council" from now on) V. 
Kuroyedov expressed the following assertion in a fundamentally important 
article in the periodical Kommunist (The Communist) : "There are 
individual cases, in which local governments occasionally permit illegal 
measures to be taken against churches and their members. Every such case 
is being viewed as a crass violation of the constitutional principle of 
the equality of religious and non-religious people before the law." 
This means that under Brezhnev and Kosygin open persecution was 
officially suspended and no serious efforts undertaken to establish 
atheism by means of the destruction of religious communities. Nonethe-
less they remained restricted within a very narrow legal framework. It 
is true that the summarizing statement, which the deputy chairman of the 
"Council", Viktor Furov, gave in 1975 to the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) and which was entitled 
"The Religious Cadres and Measures for the Restriction of their 
Activities under the Law" sounded very different from Kuroyedov' s 
remarks. Significant parts of the Furov report became known in Western 
countries in 1979. According to this document, the "Council" system-
atically uses the legally granted comprehensive control device of 
"registration," that is, the power to grant approval to church personnel 
and organizational decisions, according to its own discretion, for the 
purpose of subjecting church leadership and the episcopate to a close 
scrutiny in matters of personnel and administration. 
Furov believed that, according to their degree of willingness to 
collaborate, he could divide the 58 bishops of the Russian Orthodox 
Church (ROC) into three groups of roughly equal size: 1. the "patriots",_ 
without any particular spiritual activism, among whom he numbered 
Patriarch Pimen and the director of the foreign office, Archbishop 
Yuvenaliy, 2. the largest group, the "merely" loyal, who would do 
everything in their power within the bounds of the law to strengthen the 
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church--this group was led by Archbishop Nikodim of Leningrad and 
Novgorod, who died in 1978; and 3. those bishops, who do not avoid 
conflict with the authorities in the execution of their duties. Furov 
asserted that "a certain concern is caused by the activities of some 
young bishops, who were attracted in different ways to work with 
foreigners, but who often display great religious zeal in their own 
country and are not mindful of the recommendations of the authorities 
and of local governmental agencies." This criticism is quite noteworthy. 
It should make it possible to judge the effect of the foreign relations 
of the church with more discrimination than has been heretofore 
exercised in Western countries, especially as regards representatives of 
the Russian Orthodox Church. It frequently happens that they are 
condemned by their Western brothers and sisters and by the "Council" 
with the same arguments. 
The sensitive points for the relationship betw1:!en the government 
and religious communities are, formally considered, first, the practical 
implementation of decrees, second, on the local level, and third, for 
the individual. For all three points it is valid to say that in recent 
years there is clearly more freedom of movement here, that is, one can 
point to more rights. 
The Russian Orthodox Church with its 40-50 million members has 
presently in its service only around 7, 000 priests, two theological 
academies and three seminaries. At the present there is a shortage of 
opportunities of study for the priesthood. Because of this, the state is 
recognizing more lay people as religious; church buildings are being 
opened again; in some cases they have even been rebuilt. The Russian 
Orthodox Church has only one periodical and the complaint is heard that 
insufficient quantities of this journal and particularly of calendars, 
are being printed. This was Archbishop Pitrim's [in charge of church 
publications editor's remark] comment to a listener's question on Radio 
Moscow on September 1, 1982. "In recent years the reiigious organi-
zations in our country have published 80 titles of theological 
literature with a combined circulation of more than 1.5 million copies." 
Some religious figures definitely allow themselves the liberty of 
naming injustices, for example, Feodosiy, bishop of Poltava and 
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Kremenchug, in his appeal to Brezhnev concerning the concrete concerns 
of Orthodox Christians in the Ukraine (10/26/77). Additionally, priests 
no longer disappear without a trace or are declared to have died as they 
used to, such as those who preach the whole gospel, as the priest Dudko 
did, whose case was widely covered in the Western press. 
A spiritual renewal· of dimensions which should not be underesti-
mated seems to be taking place by means of the spread of individual 
piety. Otto Luchterhandt, generally considered an expert on the 
religious picture in the USSR, asserts: "Today, aside from old women, 
young people actually make up about 40% of the attendees at Orthodox 
services." This individual religious devotion among intellecutals in 
particular has spread to the so-called religious-philosophical seminars 
in many cities of the Soviet Union, Luchterhandt reports. 
The relations between the state and the individual religious 
communities are quite different and of varying degrees of cordiality. In 
his definitive article, Kuroyedov complains particularly about the 
Baptist-Initiativniki (Reformed Baptists), for example, who formed a 
Community in 1960 and who "wanted to live not according to Soviet but 
according to divine law." Kuroyedov also accuses the Jehovah's Witnesses 
of circumventing laws and of arousing dissatisfaction, among the 
membership, with the politics of the Soviet state and the Communist 
Party toward religion and the church. 
As a matter of note, it is precisely these two religious groups 
which have the largest growth rate in the USSR. The growth of just these 
communities is certainly also a sign of the tremendous yearning for 
meaning in life and an indication of a new awakening which is taking 
place in the Soviet population. But above all in these two 
communities--because of their evolution, if nothing else--opposition to 
the socialist system expresses itself in an entirely different way than 
can be the case in the Russian Orthodox Church. The Reformed Baptists, 
for example, do not have a hierarchical, but rather a democratic 
structure. They have a great liturgical mobility (they are not bound to 
church buildings) and they have the long underground experience of 
Russia's free churches. 
To these communities flock those people whose primary interest is 
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in their personal salvation, their emancipation in the spiritual realm 
regardless of all social restrictions. They are little concerned with 
any specific formulation of the interests of the church or with anything 
political. Viewed in this way, these religious groups are the complete 
alternative to the "Soviet way of life." 
The relation between the Soviet state and some religious groups can 
be tense for another reason, too. Here, too, the article by Kuroyedov is 
of significance. In it, he complains about priests in the Catholic 
Church, particularly in Lithuania, who encourage the.ir members to seek 
for permission for those activities in the church whic:h are not provided 
for in Soviet laws (to strive for the previously mentioned "regis-
tration"). The source of the "Council's" discomfort is revealed in the 
following closing comment by Kuroyedov. "Such extremi£.t attempts, by the 
way, are' supported by the Vatican." 
The more connections a 
"imperialist" foreign countries, 
in Western Europe or the u. S. , 
religious organization has with 
or if its main headquarters is located 
the more criticism it draws from the 
"Council". The Russian Orthodox Church has a special position insofar as 
this church is divided throughout the entire world, yet all Russian 
Orthodox churches in socialist countries recognize the Patriarch of 
Moscow and of all Russia as their leader. The remark by Kuroyedov about 
the catholic Church contains an official confirmation of what many 
religiously interested visitors to the Soviet Union have reported, 
namely that the fear of admitting to being a Christian and of accepting 
a function in the church is receding. 
Another aspect of the foreign relations of a religious group can be 
illuminated by means of the example of a correspondence in the reader's 
column of the periodical Neues Leben [New Life] (2/3/82, 3/24/82, 
5/19/82). In this major newspaper of the Soviet-German population the 
question of which nationality Mennonites who live in the Soviet Union 
hold was discussed. Are they Germans or are they Dutch? Behind this 
discussion the political question of how much freedom can a religious 
organization obtain by appealing to Soviet policies concerning foreign 
nationalities, in other words, to what extent are national prejudices 
catered to under the cover of religiosity. In fact, Mennonites tried to 
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achieve exemption from the confiscation of personal property during the 
Revolution by claiming they were Dutch. Today certain Mennonite circles 
try to encourage the spread of the German language by using German 
customs and by asserting that they are of German extraction. Therefore, 
by means of both a tie rooted outside of the Soviet system and also a 
religious tie, which is . often connected to a nationalistic one, the 
expected political loyalty to the socialist order can be diminished. The 
problem of having roots outside of the Soviet system, whether they be 
ethnic or religious, or whether they come from one's identity as an 
individual, affects more than any other group the Jewish minority in the 
USSR, which is two million strong. It also offers a minimal explanation 
for their situation, which is one without human rights, a position which 
could hardly be worse. The extensive halt called to exit visas, which 
were granted relatively generously until 1970, is directly connected to 
this divided loyalties problem as well as to the more strident politics 
of Israel (and of the USA) in the Near East. This fact proves our thesis 
again, that the increased surety of their rights and freedom on the part 
of religious communities is directly dependent on the international 
relations of the USSR and on political detente. Conversely, the 
escalation of the arms race causes even more obvious reactions on the 
religious plane than even on the economic scene. 
Since the late Archbishop Nicolay of Krutitzy and Kolommna spoke 
in front of the World Peace Conference in Paris on April 22, 1949, the 
Moscow patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has participated in 
the work of international peace, but at first only as part of the 
activities of other groups (the World Council of Churches, the Christian 
Peace Conference, and the Conference of European Churches, among 
others). In May of 1952 the Russian Orthodox Church then began to 
organize its own arrangements, in which the specific contributions of 
the world's religions for the preservation of peace were emphasized. The 
concept "peace" had already undergone a significant expansion in the 
context of the Christian Peace Conference (C.P.C). Over the years, 
numerous questions which concern the creation of just relationships on 
earth which are only indirectly related to the danger of a new war 
were also included. Thus there evolved, starting in the mid-sixties, an 
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independent concern in the Russian Orthodox Church with the theological 
questions raised in connection with the peace effort. 
Since 1977 the Russian Orthodox Church appears to be building up 
its own forum in a systematic way, outside of the Christian Peace 
Conference, for treatment of the peace question and for the cultivation 
of international relations. In this regard, Kuroyedov praised the Church 
in his address on the occasion of the official celebration of the 
birthday of Patriarch Pimen on July 23, 1978: 
In the last 10 years the Moscow Patri-
archate, led by the idea of peace, has 
considerably increased its activities in 
different international and social organ-
izations In this connection the 
important World conference of Religious 
Workers for Lasting Peace, Disarmament, 
and Just Relations between Nations cannot 
go unmentioned. This conference took 
place in Moscow in the year 1977 on the 
initiative of the Russian Orthodox Church 
and with its direct participation. To the 
present day this conference has lost 
nothing of its relevance. 
In contrast, in 1977 the Western response was still hesitant, but 
in the follow-up meetings, Western participation grew to such an extent 
that in 1982 it can be termed a significant participation. The Russian 
Orthodox Church has built a forum here, which includes, beyond the 
Christian churches, Muslims and Buddhists and which clearly surpasses 
the Christian Peace Conference, through which the international peace 
work of the Russian Orthodox Church had been primarily accomplished 
until the establishment of this forum. Conversely, the ROC has brought 
its relations with the C.P.C., the W.C.C., the Conference of European 
Churches, as well as its.relations to the larger church coalitions, into 
this new forum. This structure, which includes, in addition to the 
Christians, Muslim.s and Buddhists, is in agreement with the governmental 
view, that the global problems of peace makes it necessary that there be 
a widening of cooperation between all people without regard to their 
different world views or to their religious affiliation. 
The leaders of the "World Conference of Religious Workers for the 
Salvation of the Sacred Gift. of Life from Nuclear Catastrophe" extended 
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an invitation to Moscow for a round-table discussion from March 6-10, 
1983. "All people of good will" were to work toward achieving 
negotiations between the major nuclear powers with the aim of a total 
nuclear freeze. The title of the declaration reads: "Freeze on Nuclear 
Weapons--a Turning Point--Moral Command and Economic Necessity." 
Professor Max Stackhouse, of Andover-Newton Theological Seminary in 
Massachusetts, evaluates this discussion in his Open Letter to Patriarch 
Pimen of April 13, 1983 as follows: "The Round Table Conference on 
Nuclear Threat (March 6-10) which you convened, suggested to me and to 
several other representatives of religious bodies from around the world, 
that the Russian Orthodox Church was beginning to develop those wider 
perspectives which would allow her to engage in comparable assessments 
of Soviet policy." 
Almost simultaneously with the Round Table Discussion in Moscow, 
Patriarch Pimen directed an open letter to President Reagan, which he 
had published in the Easter 1983 edition of the New York Times (section 
3, p. 16 E) as an advertisement. Professor Stackhouse criticised this 
open message from Pimen in a letter bf reply and asserted that this 
message ran counter to the effort of the Round Table because of its 
nationalism. Stackhouse objected that "Christians everywhere acknowledge 
a propriety in patriotism so long as [it expresses only] loyalty to that 
divine reality which transcends every people, country and political 
entity." Stackhouse poses the question of how independently the Russian 
Orthodox church can express itself, or just how far her Western sisters 
and brothers can trust it. Out of the latter comes the question of the 
extent to which these statements of Pimen as well as those of Stackhouse 
are covered by belief in the temptation of Jesus Christ. 
Patriarch Pimen wrote to Reagan, among other things: "With 
bitterness and sadness in my heart I have read your bellicose appeals, 
which sow the seeds of hatred and enmity against my homeland, Russia, 
and which jeopardize peace throughout the world. These appeals are all 
the more sinful because they are couched in the guise of Christian 
morality." 
For two reasons Pimen's letter and especially his nationalism were 
understood in the United States differently than they were meant. First, 
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in the United States an understanding of the horrors, which Hitler's 
soldiers perpetrated on Russian soil, is lacking, as well as insight 
into the setting forth of literally every single force--including that 
of the church--to repulse this enemy. The result of this experience is a 
desire for peace in the Russian people, which is only equaled in nations 
which have had similar trials. The Patriarch of Moscow and cill Russia 
thus expresses in his letter the anxieties of the majority of 
congregations and clergy, who surely share them with the rest of the 
Russian people. 
Secondly, the understanding of sin and reconciliation in Orthodox 
theology is not so strongly determined by juristic categories like sin 
and punishment as in the Western churches. Therefore Pimen's appeal to 
Reagan is meant much less as a moral condemnation than it sounds. The 
theology of the ROC does differentiate between God's peace and peace in 
the world. Although it is evident that fundamentally peace is a gift 
from God and with God, nonetheless the Orthodox Church insists that 
efforts by Christians toward peace on earth contribute to the 
development of conditions in the world which strengthen what is good, 
and that these efforts by Christians therefore will serve the ultimate 
reconciliation of the-world with God. 
Understood in this way, the peace mission of the ROC is first of 
all the intimate concern of the church, and to a lesser degree a 
concession to the Soviet state or even less a mandate from the 
government, as is continuously insinuated in the West. For many Orthodox 
Christians in the USSR, the peace mission is much more closely connected 
with the question of one's personal reconciliation with God and with the 
task of the church to bring about the perfection of the world than is 
the case in most Western churches. Those who not only hear political 
statements, but who also consider the peace theology of the Moscow 
Patriarchate, will inevitably take its commitment to peace more 
seriously than has happened in the West up to this point. 
In his definitive article Kuroyedov writes: "The inclusion of 
religionists in the practical struggle for the construction of socialism 
and communism, and at the same time the constant propagation of a 
materialistic view of life among the populace, that is the scientifi-
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cally established way to overcome religious convictions." 
In this statement Kuroyedov clearly describes the opportunity and 
the cost of the new politics of the atheistic state toward the religious 
forces in his country. The cost is as follows: the atheistic state 
expects not only a neutral stance toward the socialist state, but the 
active effort of religious forces toward the strengthening of socialism. 
That does not mean that ministers or priests would be obliged to preach 
socialism, but rather that religious groups take part in the peace 
effort, that they make their contribution at home to foster a new social 
morality, and that they resist anti-communism in all its forms abroad. 
Of course, there really is anti-communism in religious garb! From the 
very beginning Christianity has been portrayed as an ideology opposed to 
communism. But is middle-class Christianity really the last and genuine 
form of Christian belief? In addition, is bourgeois democracy the form 
of government which conforms with Christianity most suitably? If the 
religious authorities make their own contribution to the work of peace 
in the widest sense, while maintaining an ideologically critical stance, 
then their efforts are not only helpful to the atheistic state, but the 
genuine quality in the contribution of the religious groups will stand 
out that much more clearly. 
With this, we have come to recognize the opportunity in this new 
politics for the religious communities, which is that they gain living 
space through participation in the international peace movement. This 
space is claimed by the churches as part of the gospel (for example, 
"Jesus Christ, the life of the world," the motto of the Vancouver, 
Assembly of W.C.C.) but it is obviously not granted to them by the 
atheistic state. Participation in the international peace movement is 
the sanctioned way out of the social ghetto for religious corr~unities. 
Through this avenue they are permitted to transcend the very narrow 
confines of a community of worship; they can express themselves 
"politically" and claim their place in the ecumenical arena, that is, 
they can cultivate international relations. Concerning the efforts 
toward peace, religious groups can serve as a bridge--on the one hand to 
circles not reached by official politics, and on the other hand they can 
transmit the opinions and attitude of the "grass roots" to the plane of 
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official politics. Such mediation in itself promotes peace in a time of 
renewed cold war and of the suspension of negotiations on the official 
political level. There is an opportunity here for religious groups, 
which, if it is used honorably by both sides, can become immeasurably 
valuable. 
In this way the ROC, still rooted in czarism, the "underground" 
Baptist Church, the anti-Communist Catholic Church and the middle-class 
Lutheran Church in the Bal tic republics of the USSR can undertake the 
immense task of being a convincing witness to "Jesus Christ, the life of 
the world" for the present day. This can certainly bi:! accomplished only 
through ecumenical cooperation in an exchange with th1:! churches in Latin 
America and Asia and with the religious communities of Western Europe 
and the United States which are often still captive of their own 
interei:;t only in each other. This becomes possible in the form of 
cooperation between all peace groups, regardless of their stance toward 
religion, something which is desired by socialist countries and which is 
certainly necessary in order to solve the global problem of peace and of 
world wide disarmament. 
Interest in cooperation on part of all, regardless of their 
world-views, is definitely evident on both sides. Obviously motivations 
for cooperation are different. Whether cooperation can be carried out 
when the interpretation of contemporary problems differs, depends surely 
on the integrity of both sides. Only practical experience will provide 
the answer. 
Translated from German by 
Dr. Erl is Glass 
Rosemont College 
Rosemont, PA 
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